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Capping Risk Adjustment?
Abstract
When premiums are community-rated, risk adjustment (RA) serves to
mitigate competitive insurers’ incentive to select favorable risks. However,
unless fully prospective, it also undermines their incentives for efficiency.
By capping its volume, one may try to counteract this tendency, exposing
insurers to some financial risk. This in term runs counter the quest to re-
fine the RA formula, which would increase RA volume. Specifically, the
adjuster, ”Hospitalization or living in a nursing home during the previous
year” will be added in Switzerland starting 2012. This paper investigates
how to minimize the opportunity cost of capping RA in terms of increased
incentives for risk selection.
The authors gratefully acknowledge helpful suggestions by Konstantin Beck
(University of Zurich and CSS Insurance Lucerne), Willard G. Manning
(University of Chicago), the Health Economics Executive Board of the
Verein fu¨r Socialpolitik at the conference 2007, and by two anonymous refer-
ees. Further, special thanks goes to the three health insurers that provided
data for this study.
1 Introduction
When premiums are community-rated, risk adjustment (RA) is introduced in or-
der to reduce competitive insurers’ incentive to select favorable risks. On the other
hand, unless fully prospective, it undermines their incentive for efficiency (Ellis
and Van de Ven [2000]). This goal conflict has been addressed by Van Barneveld
et al. [2001], who estimate optimal thresholds in the cost distribution beyond
which risk adjustment sets in. However, the implementation of such a rule be-
comes difficult when the distribution of health care expenditure (HCE) not only
shifts over time (e.g. due to a particularly high rate of cost increase in the hos-
pital sector) but also differs between insurers (e.g. due to more or less reliance
on Managed-Care options). Therefore, as a rough-and-ready measure, one might
consider simply capping the volume of RA. In this way, one exposes insurers to
some residual financial risk. At the same time, there is dissatisfaction with the
performance of current RA formulas (Van de Ven et al. [2003]). The expectation
is that by adding risk adjusters, incentives for risk selection could be reduced even
more. However, refinements of the RA formula quite likely cause the volume of
RA to increase. They therefore are in conflict with the desire to preserve efficiency
through capping the volume of RA.
This conflict has recently become acute in Switzerland. By 2005, cross-subsidization
(between individuals) has reached CHF 4.8 billion (bn.), about 1 percent of Swiss
GDP (CHF 1 ≈ US$ 0.83). The volume of partly retrospective RA (between in-
surers) amounted to CHF 1.2 bn., or some 20 percents of their payments for HCE.
These amounts were seen as incompatible with the efficiency goal by the Swiss
Council of States, who proposed to limit the volume of RA to its 2004 volume
(for the first capping-proposal see Spycher [2000]). At the same time, parliament
decided to add the criterion, ”Hospitalization or living in a nursing home dur-
ing the previous year” (”hospitalization” henceforth) to the RA formula, effective
2012. This decision was influenced by Beck et al. [2006], who had found that this
criterion serves to substantially reduce insurers’ payoff to risk selection.
With this backdrop, the present contribution purports to achieve two objectives.
First, it seeks to establish the opportunity cost of capping the volume of RA in
terms of increased incentives for risk selection. Second, it investigates the con-
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sequences of complementing the RA formula by the criterion ”hospitalization”.
Note that the volume of RA is measured in two ways throughout this paper,
drawing on the analogy between RA and a levy (and a subsidy, respectively). In
the economics of taxation, a distinction is consistently made between those who
pay a levy and those who ultimately bear it. In the case of RA, payments into
the scheme are ultimately borne by the favorable risks whose premiums exceed
the (estimated) actuarially fair value. They cross-subsidize the premiums of un-
favorable risks to the tune of CHF 4.8 bn. (2005), the first figure cited above. A
part of this cross-subsidization occurs through community-rated premiums. The
remainder is paid (but not borne) by health insurers. This component amounts
to CHF 1.2 bn. (2005), the second figure mentioned above. Analysis of RA vol-
ume so far has exclusively focused on this second, more visible component. It
is designed to neutralize insurers’ incentives to select favorable risks and is often
referred to as ”volume of RA”. To avoid confusion, this definition will be used in
this paper1. However, note that it is the total amount of cross-subsidization that
drives consumer behavior. Favorable risks have an interest in avoiding the cross-
subsidy by seeking out an insurer who offers a premium closer to the actuarially
fair volume, which remains possible as long as RA is not perfect. Conversely,
unfavorable risks have an interest in obtaining a high cross-subsidy through their
choice of insurer.
The main results of this paper are twofold. First, the introduction of the hos-
pitalization adjuster is shown to inflate the volume of cross-subsidization and of
RA in every canton of Switzerland, in some of them by more than 50 percent.
Second, reducing the amount of cross-subsidization from an estimated CHF 5.375
bn. to CHF 4.5 bn. (its 2004 volume) would reduce the volume of RA between
insurers from an estimated 1.1 to 0.98 bn. To minimize the associated incentives
for insurers to increase their risk-selection efforts, the new RA values have to be
the higher, the greater the differences between group-specific values prior to the
limitation and the greater the group’s population share.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 is devoted to a
description of the data basis, descriptive statistics, and checks of the represen-
tativeness of the data. Section 3 shows how the volumes of cross-subsidization
1 Interestingly however, Swiss statistics also do publish the amount of cross-subsidization
between individuals as ”volume of RA” (see Gemeinsame Einrichtung KVG [2005a]).
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and RA change when the additional criterion is introduced. Section 4 then takes
up the issue of capping the volume of risk adjustment. The consequences for
consumers, insurers, and Swiss cantons are analyzed. In Section 5, limiting the
volume of RA is accepted as a way to preserve insurers’ incentives for efficiency,
giving rise to an optimization problem since insurers’ tendency to turn to risk
selection again should be minimized. Section 6 discusses the consequences of
capping risk adjustment, illustrating them with an empirical example. Section 7
concludes.
2 Data basis, descriptive statistics, and
representativeness
In order to carry out this research, three large Swiss health insurers provided
individual health insurance data. Their holders of basic health insurance during
the period 2001 to 2005 were considered, totalling 2.78 million (mn.) individuals.
Besides socioeconomic variables like age, gender, and canton of residence, data on
ambulatory and hospital health care expenditure (HCE), drug expenditure, and a
variable indicating hospitalization or living in a nursing home in the previous year
were collected. To characterize the type of health insurance, the deductible and a
variable indicating choice between conventional and Managed-Care contracts were
included as well. With 49.5 percent of women, the sample is well balanced with
respect to gender. The market share of the three insurers is stable across the age
profile, amounting to 25 percent on average. Across the 26 Swiss cantons, they
are over-represented in eastern and central Switzerland and under-represented in
the northern and western parts of the country.
In Swiss health insurance, premiums are community-rated. They are uniform in
16 cantons, the remaining cantons distinguishing up to three premium regions.
In 2005, 32 percent of the population lived in cantons with uniform premiums,
while 25 percent lived in a high, 27 percent in a medium, and 16 percent in a low
premium region. With regard to the choice of contract, there is a clear trend to-
ward higher deductibles. Whereas in 2001, policies with the minimum deductible
(which amounts to CHF 300 or US$ 250 at 2007 exchange rates) had a share of
over 56 percent, this share had decreased to 50 percent by 2005. The three highest
deductibles (CHF 1,500, 2,000 and 2,500, respectively) increased in importance
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from 12 to over 22 percent during the same period. There is a similar trend in
favor of Managed-Care contracts. Especially consumers aged 31 to 35 use this
option, resulting in a share of 22 percent in this age group. However, older age
cohorts increasingly prefer Managed-Care contracts as well. For instance, among
the over 80 year old, their share went up from 10 to 18 percent between 2001 and
2005.
In Swiss risk adjustment, only two criteria are considered, age and gender. The
age classification comprises 15 classes, starting from 19-25 and continuing in 5 year
steps. By law, risk adjustment must not lead to financial reallocation between
cantons. The national volumes of cross-subsidization (CS) and RA therefore equal
the sum of the cantonal volumes. Computing these volumes using the sample data
of the three insurers and their market shares yields a CS total of CHF 4.13 bn., the
national figure being CHF 4.8 bn. (see Gemeinsame Einrichtung KVG [2005a]).
In all cantons, the calculated volumes of CS (see Table 1) and RA fall short of
the official ones. The difference is smallest in the canton of Zurich (ZH), Lucerne
(LU), and Valais (VS), amounting to less than 10 percent. It is between 10 and 20
percent in 9 other cantons, where the three insurers only hold small market shares.
This marked discrepancy could reflect successful risk-selection efforts, which have
high expected return if targeted at a small population at risk (as shown in Zweifel
and Eisen [2003], Ch. 5.5). However, there is no significant (negative) correlation
between market shares of the three insurers and deviations from the official CS
and RA figures, suggesting that risk selection is not the explanation.
Table 2 focuses on CS values, in accordance with the argument proffered in the
Introduction that they are the ones that trigger risk-selection effort on the part
of consumers. Calculated cross-subsidies per capita for all 30 groups used in risk
adjustment are shown, along with their standard errors and official countrywide
values. Young men have to bear the highest cross-subsidies (over CHF 2,000 per
year), followed by young women with CHF 1,773 per year. Over 90 year old women
benefit the most, to the tune of over CHF 8,600, followed by women of age 86 to 90
with CHF 6,917 and men of age 90+ with CHF 6,731. All age groups over 60 are
cross-subsidized by the combination of community-rating and risk adjustment. A
comparison with official values (see the last column of Table 2) shows calculated
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Table 1: Volume of cross-subsidy per canton, CHF (2005)
Canton CHF mn.* CHF mn.** CHF p.c.* CHF p.c.**
ZH 735.82 796.47 713 771
BE 592.03 678.17 768 879
LU 193.80 211.23 691 753
UR 17.57 19.97 636 723
SZ 57.00 70.85 533 662
OW 13.01 16.41 497 626
NW 15.13 17.23 485 552
GL 16.52 19.89 544 656
ZG 47.57 54.14 566 644
FR 121.48 146.44 625 754
SO 122.07 154.65 614 778
BS 110.21 161.97 719 1, 057
BL 149.81 172.14 697 800
SH 39.18 47.50 649 787
AR 20.10 24.85 483 597
AI 6.48 7.43 570 654
SG 196.02 238.19 545 662
GR 95.91 110.26 616 708
AG 259.61 312.05 573 689
TH 105.30 126.78 579 697
TI 226.03 270.02 869 1, 038
VD 430.40 502.39 852 994
VS 160.39 170.13 685 726
NE 104.10 130.63 784 984
GE 257.43 333.04 816 1, 056
JU 39.45 52.32 733 972
* Simulation, ** Official data from Gemeinsame Einrichtung KVG [2005b]
p.c. = per capita, 1 CHF = 0.83 USD (2007)
values to be too high for younger and too low for older individuals, especially for
women. These deviations are mainly responsible for the underestimation of the
total CS and RA volumes noted above. Table 2 also shows that the variance of
CS values increases with age. While the standard deviation is CHF 494 for young
women, it attains to CHF 1,770 for the oldest age class, reflecting the fact that
the variance of HCE increases with age. Overall, calculated figures come close
enough to official CS values to justify the use of sample data in the investigation
below.
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Table 2: Simulated and official cross-subsidies per capita according to age and
gender, CHF (2005)
Men Average* Std.error Min Max Official value
19-25 −2, 006.50 505.52 −3, 006.17 −707.84 −1, 963.87
26-30 −1, 227.59 833.80 −2, 165.91 2, 287.40 −1, 889.64
31-35 −900.68 678.91 −1, 733.38 1, 202.03 −1, 771.42
36-40 −979.03 421.93 −1, 749.27 247.62 −1, 624.49
41-45 −828.69 351.55 −1, 435.17 −40.31 −1, 398.94
46-50 −543.46 465.97 −1, 615.88 349.08 −1, 091.94
51-55 −109.82 378.55 −977.63 714.71 −624.63
56-60 290.34 300.27 −557.57 815.53 13.40
61-65 884.74 418.34 228.53 1, 648.89 771.06
66-70 1, 560.60 598.50 187.69 2, 464.57 1, 638.40
71-75 2, 535.19 548.54 982.57 3, 435.54 2, 873.43
76-80 3, 208.98 653.35 1, 884.58 4, 128.30 3, 845.50
81-85 4, 127.79 1, 361.80 1, 261.52 6, 983.73 4, 986.30
86-90 5, 286.51 1, 208.24 2, 752.09 7, 945.75 6, 880.09
90+ 6, 731.78 1, 513.63 2, 945.10 8, 915.78 9, 541.96
Women Average* Std.error Min Max Official value
19-25 −1, 772.99 494.20 −2, 780.08 −974.44 −1, 484.37
26-30 −1, 024.61 461.54 −2, 211.50 −311.71 −946.01
31-35 −746.06 559.49 −1, 694.31 −1, 125.73 −749.83
36-40 −961.00 328.45 −1, 576.69 −316.11 −924.81
41-45 −965.85 279.05 −1, 749.34 −535.99 −922.02
46-50 −732.01 309.04 −1, 295.60 −177.44 −646.82
51-55 −442.87 268.14 −1, 045.08 106.95 −235.80
56-60 −15.51 321.10 −512.16 841.85 205.36
61-65 443.65 247.14 19.55 764.95 737.31
66-70 981.80 395.53 210.13 1, 603.77 1, 415.39
71-75 1, 982.76 446.04 758.34 2, 662.32 2, 385.07
76-80 3, 136.84 656.22 1, 838.10 4, 406.12 3, 671.81
81-85 4, 641.23 775.55 2, 788.30 6, 111.25 5, 596.14
86-90 6, 917.12 987.66 5, 115.11 8, 382.98 8, 486.06
90+ 8, 672.75 1, 770.15 4, 464.86 11, 619.96 12, 457.28
*: Average over all 26 Swiss cantons
1 CHF = 0.83 USD (2007)
6
3 Hospitalization as an additional criterion
Current Swiss risk adjustment uses only the two criteria age and gender. How-
ever, the hospitalization adjuster will be added to the RA formula from 2012.
Beck [2004] and Beck et al. [2006] estimate that this criterion has considerable
predictive power in explaining future HCE. To prevent gaming by insurers, stays
of less than four days are not counted. Maternity stays are excluded as well since
according to Beck [2004], they do not significantly increase HCE in the following
year. The new RA formula will continue to be partly retrospective because it uses
observed rather than predicted HCE values.
The new criterion has several advantages. It is very easily collected; moreover,
being a dummy variable it does not make computation of RA payments much
more difficult. While the formula currently distinguishes 30 age-gender cells, the
number of classes would only increase to 60 (for a discussion on other alternatives
and their drawbacks see e.g. Lamers [1999], Van de Ven et al. [2004], Lamers and
Van Vliet [2003a], Lamers and Van Vliet [2003b], Ellis and Van de Ven [2000]
Beck et al. [2006], and Van de Ven and Schut [2007]). Moreover, the data is read-
ily available in every insurer’s administrative database.
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Figure 1: Cross-subsidies by age group, persons without / with hospitalization or
living in nursing home during the previous year, canton of Zurich, CHF (2005)
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Table 3: Cross-subsidization without and with the hospitalization adjuster, CHF
(2005)
Without the criterion With the criterion
Canton CHF mn. CHF p.c. CHF mn. CHF p.c. % Increase
ZH 735.82 713 898.24 870 22.1
BE 592.03 768 833.26 1, 080 40.7
LU 193.80 691 292.31 1, 042 50.8
UR 17.57 636 26.00 941 48.0
SZ 57.00 533 84.29 788 47.9
OW 13.37 497 22.98 877 71.9
NW 15.13 485 21.35 684 41.0
GL 16.52 544 24.23 798 46.6
ZG 47.57 566 71.94 855 51.2
FR 121.48 625 184.14 948 51.6
SO 122.07 614 176.52 889 44.6
BS 110.21 719 171.37 1, 118 55.5
BL 149.81 697 201.91 939 34.8
SH 39.18 649 59.72 989 52.4
AR 20.10 483 32.94 791 63.9
AI 6.48 570 9.58 842 47.8
SG 196.02 545 298.32 829 52.2
GR 95.91 616 137.59 884 43.5
AG 259.61 573 363.64 803 40.1
TH 105.30 579 173.73 955 65.0
TI 226.03 869 313.01 1, 203 38.5
VD 430.40 852 593.60 1, 175 37.9
VS 160.39 685 226.85 969 41.4
NE 104.10 784 166.65 1, 255 60.1
GE 257.43 816 375.23 1, 190 45.8
JU 39.45 733 54.38 1, 010 37.8
1 CHF = 0.83 USD (2007)
p.c. = per capita, 1 CHF = 0.83 USD (2007)
Taking this additional criterion into account, calculated cross-subsidies would in-
crease from CHF 4.13 mn. (as of 2005) to CHF 5.82 mn., i.e. by 40 percent.
According to Table 3, every canton would exhibit an increase. To put these into
perspective, note that premiums e.g. in the canton of Zurich were CHF 4,000.
Therefore, the per-capita cross-subsidy of CHF 870 would have attained almost
22 percent of premium under the new RA formula.
Moreover, the change would have completely overthrown the customary CS age
and gender profiles. Whereas under the current RA formula, the young of both
genders are burdened to the benefit of those beyond age 60, the new formula
causes hospitalization to become the crucial determinant of CS values. Figure 1
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illustrates the case of the canton of Zurich. The additional adjuster would cause
persons with a hospital stay in 2004 to be cross-subsidized in 2005 regardless of
age or gender. It is remarkable that until age 50, men benefit more (due to a
higher rate of hospitalization) than do women. With the additional criterion,
women contribute less to and receive more from cross-subsidization, with the age
group 51-55 marking the crossover (except for the 66-70 bracket).
4 Limiting the volume of risk adjustment
The volumes of cross-subsidization and risk adjustment have increased signifi-
cantly since 1996 (see Table 4), when the new law on health insurance came into
effect (and along with it, risk adjustment). Both CS growth (80.1 percent up
to 2005) and RA growth (126.8 percent) have consistently outstripped the 60.9
percent of net HCE (defined as payments by health insurers with copayments
deducted). While HCE growth, ceteris paribus, increases incentives of both fa-
vorable risks and insurers to engage in risk selection, it evidently fails to fully
explain the development of CS and RA volumes. Those discrepancies can be in-
terpreted in two ways.
Table 4: Volumes of cross-subsidization (CS) and risk adjustment (RA), CHF
(1996-2005)
Year Volume CS Change Volume RA Change Volume HCEn∗ Change
(CHF mn.) (percent) (CHF mn.) (percent) (CHF mn.) (percent)
1996 2,700 − 530 − 10,779 -
1997 2,920 +8.2 531 +0.2 11,361 +5.4
1998 3,195 +9.4 609 +14.7 11,927 +5.0
1999 3,366 +5.3 660 +8.4 12,431 +4.2
2000 3,575 +6.2 735 +11.4 13,190 +6.1
2001 3,826 +7.0 853 +16.1 13,986 +6.0
2002 4,009 +4.8 937 +9.8 14,593 +4.3
2003 4,250 +6.0 1,009 +7.7 15,336 +5.1
2004 4,568 +7.5 1,103 +9.3 16,308 +6.3
2005 4,864 +6.4 1,202 +9.0 17,353 +6.4
Average change +6.7 +5.4
Total change +80.1 +126.8 +60.9
HCEn∗: HCE - deductibles - copayments, ”net HCE”
Note: p.c. = per capita, 1 CHF = 0.83 USD (2007)
Source: Gemeinsame Einrichtung KVG [2005a], Bundesamt fu¨r Gesundheit [2007]
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On the one hand, rapid growth of RA volume may be the consequence of increases
of risk-selection effort in excess of HCE growth. On the part of insurers, this is
the predicted response to increasing discrepancies between risk-based premiums
and imposed community rating (see Zweifel [2007] for a theoretical development).
According to Table 2, this may well have been the case since the increase in
variance of HCE (reflected by the standard error of cross-subsidies) is mainly
associated with age (and hence, higher HCE). With HCE growing rapidly from
1996 to 2005 (see Table 4 again), its variance likely grew as well and with it
the gap between actuarially fair and community-rated premiums. On the part
of consumers, the favorable risks they may well have stepped up their efforts at
avoiding the rapidly increasing burden of cross-subsidization. One way was to
opt for higher deductibles and Managed-Care options because insurers, while not
permitted to pass on the full savings, still could pass on more than the ”true”
savings after deduction of risk-selection effects (which amount to between one-
and two-thirds of the full savings in the case of Managed-Care, as estimated in
Lehmann and Zweifel [2004]). As stated in Section 2, both contractual variants
gained a great deal of market share just between 2001 and 2005. This interpreta-
tion points to activities designed to circumvent premium regulation. They could
be reigned by perfecting the RA scheme. Recall that with perfect RA, insurers
would not be able to offer a share of their ”fake” savings to consumers who seek
to dodge the cross-subsidy. This consideration motivated the Swiss parliament to
pass a refinement of the RA formula by including the hospitalization criterion.
On the other hand, such a refinement causes CS and RA volumes to increase
substantially, as evidenced in Section 3. The consequence is to increasingly shel-
ter insurers from financial risk undermining their incentive to improve efficiency.
Moreover, risk adjustment seems to have become a redistributive scheme with a
life of its own. Indeed, the CS volume in favor of the old grew even faster than
the 80 percent shown in Table 4 (not evidenced here), which was not anticipated.
These considerations motivated the Swiss Council of States to propose capping
the RA volume at its 2004 value (CHF 4.8 bn.).
As a certainly second-best measure, capping the volume of RA (or indeed CS) is
considered below. A simple limit in nominal terms would even have the advantage
of increasing insurers’ risk exposure over time, forcing them to step up their
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efficiency-enhancing efforts. It could be imposed at three levels, the aggregate
(broken down to insurers according to market share, which may be changing
over time), the individual insurer (fixed over time), and the consumer (limiting
directly the amount of cross-subsidization). Only a cap on total RA volume will
be considered because it is invariant to changes in market share and structure.
A question that naturally arises at this point is who bears the consequences of a
cap. Three parties can be identified.
• The individual insured. A cap on RA volume causes premiums to converge
towards risk-rated values, causing CS values to decrease [also to a mitigation
of moral-hazard effects (see e.g. Zweifel and Breuer [2006])].
• The insurers. In a system with community-rated premiums, risk adjustment
is introduced to eliminate (or reduce) incentives for risk selection. Capping
its volume (directly or indirectly through limiting CS) causes insurers not
to be fully compensated anymore for enrolling unfavorable risks. In the
Swiss context, there are two predicted responses. One is to eschew high
risks, using known means such as losing application forms. The other is to
form conglomerates with a shared sales office (see Van de Ven et al. [2003]).
Potential clients are quickly assessed on the telephone and assigned to a
low-premium affiliate if found a low risk or a high-premium one otherwise.
While the lower risks are happy to accept, the high ones often prefer to
accept the higher premium to overcoming the hurdles erected by conven-
tional competitors with their lower community-rated premium. Although
this practice is not in the spirit of the law, it is legal because each affiliate
of the conglomerate does charge a uniform premium.
• The cantons. Capping risk adjustment increases the financial burden of
cantons with an unfavorable risk structure because the cantons pay part of
the subsidies to those (in part high-risk) citizens whose premiums exceed a
certain share of their income. However, the federal government is affected
as well through matching grants.
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5 Optimizing the cap on the volume of risk
adjustment
The preceding section has shown that capping the volume of risk adjustment has
opportunity costs in terms of increased risk-selection efforts on the part of both
insurers and consumers. This gives rise to an optimization problem: How is the
cap to be allocated to minimize its opportunity cost? The development below
focuses on insurers’ incentive for risk selection, neglecting changes in consumer
behavior in response to reduced cross-subsidies.
Swiss risk adjustment is based on age and gender. Its values are calculated in the
following way,
RAa,g = L¯a,g − L¯, (1)
where a and g are indexes for age and gender categories, RAa,g is the payment to
(RAa,g < 0) or from (RAa,g > 0) risk adjustment in group (a, g), L¯a,g is average
HCE in group (a, g), and L¯ is average HCE paid by insurers in the population as a
whole. The volume of risk adjustment (V ) can then be calculated as in Equation
(2),
V = {
15∑
a=1
1∑
g=0
|RAa,g|na,g}/2, (2)
where n is the number of insureds of risk group with age a and gender g. RA
payments are considered in absolute values to avoid canceling out positive and
negative values. However, this makes the division by two necessary to avoid dou-
ble counting.
Favorable risks contribute to the insurer’s margin, which can be used to cover the
deficits generated by unfavorable risks. The insurer is exposed to a higher risk
of insolvency if these deficits are large. Reserves can be used to ensure solvency,
but too many outliers endanger the economic survival of the insurer. There are
several methods for analyzing the importance of such outliers, such as value at
risk or expected loss at risk (see Hull [2006]). However, the easiest way to proceed
is to analyze the variance of HCE falling on the insurer.
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If one considers age and gender as the only determinants of HCE (which is in
accord with current Swiss risk adjustment), then variance in HCE across these
groups is given by
s2L =
∑
a
∑
g(L¯a,g − L¯)
2na,g∑
a
∑
g na,g
(3)
where L¯ is total average HCE in a specific canton (recall that risk adjustment is
calculated in each canton separately), and L¯a,g is average HCE of a specific age
and gender cell. As of 2006, s2L is estimated by Beck et al. [2006] at CHF 12 bn.
Risk adjustment thus serves to reduce the variance of HCE falling on insurers
(and therefore mitigate the incentive to ”skim the cream”). This can be seen by
plugging Equation (1) into Equation (3) and rearranging terms,
s2L =
∑
a
∑
g RA
2
a,gna,g∑
a
∑
g na,g
(4)
and hence,
(
∑
a
∑
g
na,g)s
2
L =
∑
a
∑
g
RA2a,gna,g. (5)
Equation (5) shows that with a constant number of individuals in each age and
gender cells, RA values must be increasing with increasing differences in HCE
between groups. This of course serves to increase RA volume as well. If age and
gender would be the only determinants of HCE (i.e. if insurers had no private
information about individuals, contrary to the analysis by Shen and Ellis [2002a],
Shen and Ellis [2002b]), then risk adjustment would eliminate all risk induced by
community rating. Prior to capping the volume of risk adjustment, the variance
borne by the health insurer (sHI) would be zero, s
2
HI=0. This evidently does
not hold in the present context because RA in Switzerland is far from perfect
(Beck et al. [2006]).2 Whatever the initial value of s2HI , capping the volume
of risk adjustment causes it to increase. The objective therefore is to minimize
this increase, subject to RA volume not exceeding the cap V¯ . Risk adjustment
payments R̂Aa,g are the decision variables in the problem,
min
R̂Aa,g
sˆ2HI − s
2
HI s.t. V ≤ V¯ , (6)
2 Note, however, in both cases (s2
HI
=0 or s2
HI
=c, where c is a constant) the results for the
optimization problem is the same, since a constant cancels out when taking derivatives.
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with sˆ2HI denoting the variance when volume is capped. Of course the optimiza-
tion must take into account that risk adjustment is zero sum. This however is
always achieved since positive and negative RA values cancel out.
If volume is defined as in Equation (2), optimization is difficult due to absolute
values. An alternative approach is therefore taken here. First, the positive half
variance sˆ2HI+ (with the restriction on RA volume), and then, the negative half
variance sˆ2HI− (with the same restriction on RA volume) is minimized, ensuring
that RA values sum to zero,
min
R̂Aa,g
[(sˆ2HI+) + (sˆ
2
HI−)]− s
2
HI . (7)
Because s2HI is predetermined, it is obvious that only the terms in brackets are
relevant. The first term can be broken down as shown in Equation (8),
min sˆ2HI+ =
∑
a
∑
g(xa,g − x¯)
2na,g∑
a
∑
g na,g
s.t. xa,g > x¯. (8)
The symbols are defined as follows,
xa,g = (La,g − R̂Aa,g)
x¯ = L¯
xa,g − x¯ = (La,g − R̂Aa,g − L¯)
= (RAa,g − R̂Aa,g). (9)
Here, R̂Aa,g > 0 if the insurer receives a payment from the RA scheme and con-
sumers in the (a, g) cell receive a cross-subsidy. Conversely, R̂Aa,g < 0 if it pays
into the scheme (and low-risk consumers bear a cross-subsidy).
Since the restriction V ≤ V¯ always holds as an equality in Equation (6), the
problem can be solved using a Lagrangian,
min
R̂Aa,g
Z = (sˆ2+)− λ(
∑
a
∑
g
R̂Aa,gna,g − V¯ ), ∀ R̂Aa,g > 0 (10)
=
∑
a
∑
g(RAa,g − R̂Aa,g)
2na,g∑15
a=1
∑1
g=0 na,g
− λ(
∑
a
∑
g
R̂Aa,gna,g − V¯ )
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where the subscript HI is dropped for simplicity. The solution to this problem
shows how positive payments received from the RA scheme are optimally reduced.
Payments into the scheme (R̂Aa,g < 0) are fully analogous. The first-order con-
ditions are,
∂Z
∂R̂Aa,g
=
−2(RAa,g − R̂Aa,g)na,g∑
a
∑
g na,g
− λna,g = 0 (11)
∂Z
∂λ
=
15∑
a=1
1∑
g=0
R̂Aa,gna,g − V¯ = 0.
This is a system of linear equations in R̂Aa,g and λ that has full rank and can
therefore be solved. An example with four risk classes is given as follows.
Assume a hypothetical RA scheme distinguishing four groups i = 0, 1, 2, 3 with ni
the number of individuals in that group and n the overall number of individuals.
Let two groups (0 and 1) have below-average and two (2 and 3), above-average
expected HCE. RAi indicates risk adjustment payments for each group. The first-
order conditions for negative payments (i.e. payments to the RA scheme, groups
0 and 1) are,
∂Z
∂R̂A0
=
−2(RA0 − R̂A0)n0
n
− λn0 = 0 (12)
∂Z
∂R̂A1
=
−2(RA1 − R̂A1)n1
n
− λn1 = 0
∂Z
∂λ
= R̂A0n0 + R̂A1n1 − V¯ = 0.
Now λ can be solved for from the first FOC,
λ =
−2(RA0 − R̂A0)
n
. (13)
Equation (13) shows the determinants of the opportunity cost caused by the cap.
First, the greater the population at risk (n), the smaller this cost. Second, the
greater the difference between RA payments with and without the cap (RA0 −
R̂A0), the higher this cost. In addition, the system (12) can be solved to yield,
(RA0 − R̂A0) = (RA1 − R̂A1) (14)
R̂A0n0 + R̂A1n1 = V¯ .
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It is evident that the optimal reduction of RA values are the same across risk
categories. Solving this system of two equations in the two unknowns yields the
following solution payments to the RA scheme,
R̂A0 =
V¯ − (RA11 +RA0)n1
n0 + n1
=
V¯ h1
n1
− (RA1 −RA0)h1 (15)
R̂A1 =
V¯ − (RA0 +RA1)n0
n0 + n1
=
V¯ h0
n0
− (RA0 −RA1)h0
with hi noting the share of group i in the subpopulation with below-average HCE.
Therefore, the optimal new RA values are
• the lower, the lower the cap is set;
• the lower, the greater the positive difference in RA values prior to the limi-
tation (e.g. RA1 > RA0);
• the higher, the greater the negative difference in RA values prior to the
limitation (e.g. RA0 < RA1);
• the higher, the higher the group’s population share hi (even for small n0
since V¯ >> (RA1 −RA0)).
The payments received from the RA scheme can be derived in an analogous way.
6 Consequences of capping risk adjustment
As argued in Sections 1 and 2, risk-selection behavior is ultimately driven by the
amount of cross-subsidization contained in contributions to health insurance. And
in the case of Switzerland, the political debate revolving around risk adjustment
has focused on the CS rather than the RA volume. For these reasons, this section
cites more CS rather than RA figures.
6.1 Theoretical considerations
The question as to the optimal value of the cap cannot be addressed in this paper.
It requires knowledge of citizens’ willingness to pay for avoiding risk-selection ef-
forts by health insurers while keeping community-rated premiums. Experimental
evidence concerning willingness to pay for attributes of health services provision
has been presented in e.g. Zweifel et al. [2006], Telser et al. [2004], and concerning
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attributes of health insurance, in Becker [2006] and Becker et al. [2007]. How-
ever, willingness to pay for maintaining community-rated premiums has not been
measured to the knowledge of the authors. As a second-best solution, parliament
could decide on the value of the cap, assuming that politicians represent the pref-
erences of the population.
While the political debate has focused on the national level, cantons will likely
be affected as well. As evident from Equations (9) and (11), the opportunity
cost of a cap on risk adjustment is linked to the dispersion of HCE, which varies
between cantons. If CS an RA volumes were to be limited, many citizens with
low incomes would have to pay higher premiums. This creates political pressure
for increased redistribution through premium subsidies. More generous cantons
would be more prone to increasing their subsidies, which are matched by the
federal level, where a substantial amount of redistribution between cantons takes
place. Therefore, a limit on CS and RA volumes is likely to induce a certain
amount of cross-subsidization between cantons.
Focusing on the opportunity cost of a cap in terms of incentives when an additional
adjuster is introduced, there are two effects to be distinguished. First, since HCE
is now predicted more precisely, the variance of HCE borne by insurers decreases
and with it risk-selection effort. Second, unless the additional adjuster exhibits
perfectly negative correlation with the existing ones, CS and RA volumes must
increase. However, the incidence of hospitalization increases with age and is
higher among women than men; therefore volumes increase. This increase affects
the opportunity cost, depending on the situation.
• The benchmark case is no cap, combined with the introduction of the hos-
pitalization criterion into the RA formula. This simply reduces the variance
in HCE to be borne by insurers, thus mitigating incentives for risk selection
[see Equation (4)].
• The cap is imposed but not binding initially; it becomes binding with the
introduction of the additional RA criterion. Therefore the opportunity cost
of the cap was zero at the beginning. It would become positive but still
small if the CS volume had to be reduced from CHF 4.6 to 4.5 bn. since the
effect on insurer behavior is still limited. However, a future reduction from
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CHF 6 to 4.5 bn. (say), would cause opportunity cost to rise [see Equation
(13)].
• The third alternative is the introduction of the additional RA criterion when
the cap is already binding. On the one hand, this would serve to reduce the
volatility of HCE falling on health insurers. On the other hand, the restric-
tion on CS volume becomes even more binding. The first effect mitigates
incentives for risk selection, while the second strengthens them. The net
effect remains ambiguous [see Equation (4) and (13), respectively].
Note that CS and RA volumes can always be reduced by permitting health insur-
ers to charge premiums that are more in line with true risk. For example, suppose
smokers pay an additional premium of CHF 50 per year. This would decrease the
difference between HCE and premium revenue by CHF 50 ceteris paribus and
hence the variance of payments and with it the risk to be borne by the health
insurer. Incentives for risk selection decrease. The advantage of more risk-rated
premiums is that RA volume declines endogenously without inducing more efforts
at risk selection; its drawback is deviating from community-rating. Conversely,
the advantage of capping CS and RA volumes is that community-rating can be
retained, while its downside is that incentives for risk selection are strengthened.
6.2 Empirical illustration
Since the unit of reference for Swiss risk adjustment is the canton, the effects of
limiting its volume can be exemplified by using data for the canton of Zurich,
assuming a decrease of CS volume from the estimated nationwide CHF 5.375 bn.
level to CHF 4.5 bn. The estimate is derived from pitting expected HCE at the
individual level against the mean applicable to each of the 25 health insurers op-
erating in the Canton of Zurich. Expected HCE was estimated using a two-part
model along the lines of Steinmann et al. [2007], pooling the data provided by
the three health insurers. However, dummy variables reflecting RA cells replaced
continuously measured age. Other dummies are female gender and canton of res-
idence.
Figure 2 shows that the estimated age profile of HCE closely reflects to that of the
three insurers (”Actual”) that provided the data. However, the increase of HCE
with higher age at the national level (”Official”) is still underestimated. Overall,
18
02'000
4'000
6'000
8'000
10'000
12'000
14'000
16'000
18'000
19
-
25
26
-
30
31
-
35
36
-
40
41
-
45
46
-
50
51
-
55
56
-
60
61
-
65
66
-
70
71
-
75
76
-
80
81
-
85
86
-
90 90
+
C
H
F
Estimated Actual Official
Figure 2: HCE of women by age, actual, estimated (three insurers), and official,
Switzerland, CHF (2005)
estimated HCE seem to fit the Swiss average sufficiently well to derive estimates
of the effect a cap on CS volume may have, assuming that it is imposed in a way
as to minimize its opportunity cost (as expounded in Section 5).
Table 5 illustrates the effects of a reduction of CS from CHF 5.375 bn. to CHF 4.5
bn. for the canton of Zurich (number of insured: 1,032,600). Initially the youngest
age class of women pays a premium that exceeds expected HCE by some CHF
1,600, used to finance the higher HCE of Zurich residents above 50 years of age.
Capping the CS volume would reduce this excess by CHF 236. On the other
hand, the highest age group of females currently receives more than CHF 11,000
as a cross-subsidy. This would be reduced by CHF 435. An exception is the
class of 51-55 year old women, which changes from receivers to neutral.3 These
amounts are to be compared with the average Zurich premium, which was about
CHF 4,000 in 2005.
3 According to Equation (14), optimal reduction of RA values is the same across risk cate-
gories. However, since the class of 51-55 year old women and 56-60 year old men changes
from receiver to payer, RA values have to be adjusted correspondingly.
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Table 5: Capping the volume of cross-subsidies, canton of Zurich, CHF (2005)
Women Without cap Change With cap
19-25 −1, 618 +236 −1, 382
26-30 −1, 103 +236 −867
31-35 −772 +236 −536
36-40 −830 +236 −594
41-45 −789 +236 −553
46-50 −350 +236 −114
51-55 283 −283 0
56-60 855 −435 421
61-65 1479 −435 1, 045
66-70 2, 126 −435 1, 691
71-75 2, 886 −435 2, 451
76-80 4, 191 −435 3, 757
81-85 5, 983 −435 5, 549
86-90 8, 643 −435 8, 209
90+ 11, 250 −435 10, 816
Men Without cap Change With cap
19-25 −2, 347 +236 −2, 111
26-30 −2, 290 +236 −2, 054
31-35 −2, 191 +236 −1, 955
36-40 −2, 073 +236 −1, 837
41-45 −1, 800 +236 −1, 564
46-50 −1, 479 +236 −1, 243
51-55 −548 +236 −312
56-60 223 −223 0
61-65 1, 223 −435 788
66-70 2, 085 −435 1, 650
71-75 3, 301 −435 2, 866
76-80 3, 276 −435 2, 841
81-85 4, 851 −435 4, 417
86-90 7, 162 −435 6, 728
90+ 9, 419 −435 8, 985
Note: 1 CHF = 0.83 USD (2007)
Naturally, capping the CS volume has an impact on insurers operating in the can-
ton of Zurich as well. First, the decrease in CS values evidenced in Table 5 implies
an increase in the deviations between actual and average HCE falling on them.
Therefore, the variance of HCE borne by them (s2HI in Section 5) is bound to
increase, very likely triggering additional risk-selection efforts on this part. This
effect would even be more pronounced if the cap on CS and RA volumes were to
be imposed in a non-optimal way. Second, the amount of RA transferred between
insurers would fall. This effect was estimated in the following way. Equation (1)
for determining RA values was implemented using the estimated HCE function
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Table 6: Change of CS and RA volumes, CHF bn. (2005)
Without With Change
cap cap
CS volume between consumers 5.375 4.500 -16.3%
RA volume between insurers 1.123 0.982 -12.5%
Note: 1 CHF = 0.83 USD (2007)
to assign HCE values to age/gender/hospitalization cells of all 25 insurers. Next,
the pool over which risk adjustment is defined was restricted to these 25 insurers.
For the canton of Zurich, the error incurred is small because out of the 1,032,600
insured, only 172,671 do not belong to one of three insurers considered or one
of the additional 22 sampled. Moreover, the resulting underestimation should
not influence the percentage reduction much since it affects both uncapped and
capped values. With the 25 insurers having a nationwide market share of 60
percent, the resulting total of RA values is scaled up accordingly to obtain CHF
1.123 bn. as the national estimate prior to imposing a cap (see Table 6).
For simplicity, the simulated RA values with the CS cap were not optimized
[implementing the equation system (11) would constitute a research paper of its
own] but simply allocated evenly to the age/gender/hospitalization status cells
of insurers according to their shares in current RA volume. Thus, the cap on
CS volume would reduce the RA volume by an estimated 12.5 percent. This is
markedly less than the 16.3 percent reduction of CS volume because a great deal
of cross-subsidization occurs between consumers enrolled in a given fund.
7 Conclusions
This contribution addresses the conflict of interest arising in the context of imper-
fect risk adjustment (RA). On the one hand, a refinement of the RA formula would
weaken health insurers’ incentive to engage in risk selection (given that they are
subject to community rating). On the other hand, unless fully prospective, risk
adjustment undermines their quest for efficiency. There are three novel aspects
to this paper. First, it adopts standard economic theorizing by distinguishing
between the insures who pay (through their contributions to the RA scheme) and
the favorable risks who ultimately bear these cross-subsidies (CS), amounting to
the difference between their actual and their actuarially fair premium. Second, as
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a rough-and-ready measure to expose insurers to a degree of financial risk, a cap
on risk adjustment is considered and the resulting optimization problem studied.
The issue is to structure the reduced RA values in a way as to minimize the
increase of HCE variance borne by the insurer (and hence risk-selection effort).
Third, the study simulates the consequences of a cap (on total CS rather than
RA volume) both for consumers and insurers.
In a first step, data provided by three Swiss health insurers are compared to
official nationwide averages to assess their representativeness. Overall, the data
seem to accord with official statistics to a sufficient degree to justify more detailed
investigation.
Next, the refinement of the Swiss RA formula effective 2012 is considered. The
inclusion of the additional criterion, ”Hospitalization or living in a nursing home
during the previous year”, is found to inflate CS volume by 40 percent on aver-
age and to cause age and gender to lose importance as risk adjusters throughout.
This increase of CS (and hence RA) volume contradicts the objective of enhancing
insurers’ incentives for efficiency by exposing them to more financial risk, to be
achieved by a cap on RA volume.
This conflict of interest gives rise to the optimization problem, ”Minimize the
HCE variance falling on the insurer (and therefore the incentive for risk selec-
tion), subject to RA volume not exceeding a politically determined level”. The
optimal solution calls for a uniform reduction of positive and negative RA values
the amount of which depends on existing differences between groups in terms of
RA values and their population shares.
A simulation extrapolating from one Swiss canton shows that a reduction of CS
volume to CHF 4.5 bn. (by 16 percent) at the national level would reduce the
RA volume between insurers by an estimated 12.5 percent. The optimized CS
burden would drop slightly for those up to age 55, juxtaposed by a reduction of
CS in favor of those above 55. However, HCE variance falling on insurers would
increase, strengthening their incentives for risk selection.
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This research is subject to several limitations. First, the refinement of the RA for-
mula considered is one among many, e.g. the inclusion of diagnostic information.
Second, capping CS (or RA) values to push insurers towards efficiency is cer-
tainly second best. This objective could be achieved at a lower opportunity cost
if alternatives such as optimized cut-off points in the HCE distribution (beyond
which RA sets in) were considered, with potentially quite different implications
for CS values between consumers. Third, behavior of insurers was assumed to
be driven by the HCE variance falling on them, while that of consumers, by the
gap between the actual and the actuarially fair premium. Especially the latter
assumption can be criticized for its neglect of fairness considerations. Still, this
research does address some of the issues raised by a rough-and-ready measure
that may appeal to politicians, such as simply capping the amount of RA (or CS)
volume.
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